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THE SOUND OF SILENCE:
THE LEGALITY OF THE AMERICAN
"KILL SWITCH" BILL
Deborah Beth Medows
In today's culture, many of our daily interactions depend on the
Internet. Internet connectivity empowers us to engage in commerce,
contact faraway relatives, or even find a future spouse. This begs the
question: To what extent can the government of the United States
deny a citizen's Internet access, and under what legal framework is
the effective silencing of the Internet lawful?
This Article explores the technicalities of how Internet censorship
works. It then provides a basic introduction to cyberattacks and the
types of dangers that such attacks pose. Then, it discusses the
framework of the "kill switch" phenomenon by citing examples of
governments that have interfered with their inhabitants' Internet
connectivity. Finally, this Article evaluates the legality of pending
kill switch legislation in the United States under the scope of the
President's executive powers and the First Amendment's free speech
protections.

I.
A.

lNTRANATIONAL SILENCING

How Intranational Censorship Technically Works

A government's ability to disconnect a country's Internet usage is
widely known by the pejorative term "kill switch." 1 In actuality, the
term is a misnomer. It is unrealistic to envision that governmental
authorities could employ a physical switch to disconnect computers
from the Internet. 2 Instead, governmental officials would need to
contact Internet Service Providers (ISPs), who would then authorize
1.

See Bianca Bosker, Internet "Kill Switch" Would Give President Power
to Shut Down The Web, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 17, 2010, 4:20 PM,
updated
May
25,
2011,
5:50
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/17 /internet-kill-switchwoul_n_615923.html (describing the proposed Protecting Cyberspace as
a National Asset Act, which, if passed, would allow the "president the
authority 'to seize control of or even shut down portions of the
Internet.'").

2.

E.g. David Knowles, Internet Kill Switch: Should the United States
AOL NEWS
(Jan.
28,
2011,
2:46
PM),
Emulate Egypt?,
http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/28/internet-kill-switch-should-theunited-states-emulate-egypt/ ("What is most likely is that somebody in
the government gives a phone call to a small number of people and says,
'Turn it off."').

59

JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THEINTERNET · VoL.4 ·No.

l · 2012

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET ·VOL. 4 ·No.

l · 2012

The Sound of Silence

The Sound of Silence

their engineers to change the configuration of the Internet traffic flow
to stop service to the populace. 3 As a result of the governmental
action, that portion of the population which previously could connect
to the Internet would no longer be able to do so. 4

millions of dollars .10 Over three million people across dozens of
Brazilian cities lost Internet connection and the world's largest iron
ore producer, located in one of those cities, lost seven million dollars
when the attack disconnected seven of its plants from the Internet. 11
In March of 2001, a disgruntled former employee successfully hacked
into the Australian computerized sewage system and released millions
of liters of waste into public waterways. 12 These examples are
alarming, and as a result of the scope of devastation made possible by
these forms of attacks, government-perpetrated cyberattacks may
constitute an act of warfare. 13
Although the public may not generally be cognizant of the risks
posed by cyberattacks, governments must be allowed to develop a
strategy to counteract this new method of attack. Cyberattacks are
different from conventional acts of warfare due to the speed with
which cyberattacks devastate infrastructure, 14 the perpetrator's low
cost of creating such devastation, 15 and the obstacles that prevent law
enforcement from learning the attacker's identities. 16 As theorist
Herman Kahn wrote, virtual attacks are complicated because "[t]he

B.

The Need for Intragovernmental ''Kill Switches" in the Age of
Cyberattacks

Governments, including that of the United States, may need to
disconnect computers from the Internet to counteract the effects of or
'
to prevent, a cyberattack. 5 This necessity is realistic because this
form of attack is not brand-new; there are several notable instances of
wide-scale cyberattacks. 6
In 1982, the United States allegedly
attacked the Siberian pipeline by placing a logic bomb into software
which caused an explosion. 7 Iran blamed Israel and the United State~
for planting the Stuxnet worm, which was capable of seizing control
of industrial plants, in Iran's nuclear facilities. 8 The cyberattack
eliminated approximately twenty percent of the facility's nuclear
centrifuges. 9 In 2007, a cyberattack in Brazil that was propagated for
unclear motives, distressed millions of Brazilians and cost the country
3.

Id. ("And then· one engineer at each service provider logs into the
equipment and changes the configuration of how traffic should flow.").

10.

See id. (describing how the cyberattacks in Brazil caused harm to the
country).

4.

Id. (describing how a "kill switch" would allow the government to
disconned a portion of society from the Internet).

11.

Id.

5.

12.

Id.

See, e.g., Amar Toor, The Internet "Kill Switch" Bill: What It Is, and
Why It Wo~'t Die, SWITCHED
(Feb. 1, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://www.sw1tched.com/2011/02/01/internet-kill-switch-bill-what-itis-wont-die/ (describing the proposed bill and how the legislation "would
provide a mechanism for the government to work with the private sector
in the event of a true cyber emergency.").

13.

See Dan Rivers, On the Frontline of Cyber Warfare, CNN TECH (Nov.
4,
2010,
4:48
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010 /TECH/web /10 /28 /malaysia.cyber .security /i
ndex.html .("In the future, warfare may shift from a battlefield to a
keyboard. Superpowers might deem a nuclear exchange too destructive,
but already they are developing Weapons of Mass Disruption; software
viruses that are designed to cripple the operating systems of power
stations, dams, traffic lights and public transport.").

14.

See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's
Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 99 (2010) ("Cyberwarfare is like
maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most.").

15.

See id. at 98-99 ("The low cost of computing devices means that U.S.
adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons . . . to pose a
significant threat to U.S. military capabilities. A dozen determined
computer programs can ... threaten the United States' global logistics
network, steal its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or
hinder its ability to deliver weapons on target.").

16.

See Kim Zetter, Former NSA Director: Countries Spewing Cyberattacks
Should be Held Responsible, WIRED (Jul. 29, 2010, 3:52 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07 /hayden-at-~lackhat/
.
("Attribution is one of the biggest problems on the mternet when it
comes to cyberwarfare. How do you hold a nation responsible for
malicious attacks if you can't determine whether the activity was statesponsored? ").

6.

See Olivia Solon, Do We Need a Geneva Convention for Cyber
Warfare?,
WIRED
(Oct.
15,
2010),
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2010-10/15/cyber-warfare-ethics
(describing different examples of when cyber attacks have occurred, such
as the Siberian pipeline logic bomb, and attacks in Estonia, Georgia,
and even on Google).

7.

See id. ("In 1982, the U.S. reportedly sabotaged the Siberian pipeline
through a logic bomb planted in software, causing an explosion.").

8.

See id.; see also Stuxnet Worm Hits Iran Nuclear Plant Staff
Computers, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (Sept. 26, 2010, 10:57 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11414483
(describing
how the worm has infected the personal computers of staff members).

9.

See Jon Swartz, "Kill, Switch" Internet Bill, A"/nrms Privacy Experts, USA TODAY,
(Feb.
15,
2011,
3:16
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2011-02-15-killswitch_N.htm ("The Stuxnet computer worm wiped out about 203 of
Iran's ,nucl~~r centrifuges and helped delay, though not destroy,
Tehran s ability to make its first nuclear arms.").
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their engineers to change the configuration of the Internet traffic flow
to stop service to the populace. 3 As a result of the governmental
action, that portion of the population which previously could connect
to the Internet would no longer be able to do so. 4

millions of dollars. 10 Over three million people across dozens of
Brazilian cities lost Internet connection and the world's largest iron
Ore producer located in one of those cities, lost seven million dollars
'
when the attack
disconnected seven of its plants from the Internet. 11
In March of 2001, a disgruntled former employee successfully hacked
into the Australian computerized sewage system and released millions
of liters of waste into public waterways. 12 These examples are
alarming, and as a result of the scope of devastation made possible by
these forms of attacks, government-perpetrated cyberattacks may
constitute an act of warfare. 13
Although the public may not generally be cognizant of the risks
posed by cyberattacks, governments must be allowed to develop a
strategy to counteract this new method of attack. Cyberattacks are
different from conventional acts of warfare due to the speed with
which cyberattacks devastate infrastructure, 14 the perpetrator's low
cost of creating such devastation, 15 and the obstacles that prevent law
enforcement from learning the attacker's identities. 16 As theorist
Herman Kahn wrote, virtual attacks are complicated because "[t]he

B.

The Need for Intragovernmental "Kill Switches" in the Age of
Cyberattacks

Governments, including that of the United States, may need to
disconnect computers from the Internet to counteract the effects of or
'
to prevent, a cyberattack. 5 This necessity is realistic because this
form of attack is not brand-new; there are several notable instances of
wide-scale cyberattacks. 6
In 1982, the United States allegedly
attacked the Siberian pipeline by placing a logic bomb into software,
which caused an explosion. 7 Iran blamed Israel and the United States
for planting the Stuxnet worm, which was capable of seizing control
of industrial plants, in Iran's nuclear facilities. 8 The cyberattack
eliminated approximately twenty percent of the facility's nuclear
centrifuges. 9 In 2007, a cyberattack in Brazil that was propagated for
unclear motives, distressed millions of Brazilians and cost the country
3.

Id. ("And then one engineer at each service provider logs into the
equipment and changes the configuration of how traffic should flow.").

10.

See id. (describing how the cyberattacks in Brazil caused harm to the
country).

4.

Id. (describing how a "kill switch" would allow the government to
disconne_ct a portion of society from the Internet).

11.

Id.

5.

12.

Id.

See, e.g., Amar Toor, The Internet "Kill Switch" Bill: What It Is, and
Why It Won't Die, SWITCHED
(Feb. 1, 2011, 3:00 PM),
http://www.switched.com/2011/02/01/internet-kill-switch-bill-what-itis-wont-die/ (describing the proposed bill and how the legislation "would
provide a mechanism for the government to work with the private sector
in the event of a true cyber emergency.").

13.

See Dan Rivers, On the Frontline of Cyber Warfare, CNN TECH (Nov.
2010,
4:48
AM),
4
http:/ /www.cnn.com/2010 /TECH/web /10 /28 /malaysia.cyber .security /i
ndex.html , ("In the future, warfare may shift from a battlefield t? a
keyboard. Superpowers might deem a nuclear exchange too destructive,
but already they are developing Weapons of Mass Disruption; software
viruses that are designed to cripple the operating systems of power
stations, dams, traffic lights and public transport.").

14.

See William J. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's
Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 99 (2010) ("Cyberwarfare is like
maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most.").

15.

See id. at 98-99 ("The low cost of computing devices means that U.S.
adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons . . . to pose a
significant threat to U.S. military capabilities. A do,zen deter~in_ed
computer programs can ... threaten the United States global log1st1cs
network, steal its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or
hinder its ability to deliver weapons on target.").

16.

See Kim Zetter, Former NBA Director: Countries Spewing Cyberattacks
Should be Held Responsible, WIRED (Jul. 29, 2010, 3:52 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07 /hayden-at-1?lackhat/
.
("Attribution is one of the biggest problems on the mternet when it
comes to cyberwarfare. How do you hold a nation responsible for
malicious attacks if you can't determine whether the activity was statesponsored? ").

6.

See Olivia Solon, Do We Need a Geneva Convention for Cyber
Warfare?,
WIRED
(Oct.
15,
2010),
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2010-10/15/cyber-warfare-ethics
(describing different examples of when cyber attacks have occurred, such
as the Siberian pipeline logic bomb, and attacks in Estonia, Georgia,
and even on Google).

7.

See id. ("In 1982, the U.S. reportedly sabotaged the Siberian pipeline
through a logic bomb planted in software, causing an explosion.").

8.

See id.; see also Stuxnet Worm Hits Iran Nuclear Plant Staff
Computers, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (Sept. 26, 2010, 10:57 AM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-rniddle-east-11414483
(describing
how the worm has infected the personal computers of staff members).

9.

See Jon Swartz, "Kill Switch" Iniernet Bill Aln:rms Privacy Experts, USA TODAY,
(Feb.
15,
2011,
3:16
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy /2011-02-15-killswitch_N.htm ("The Stuxnet computer worm wiped out about 203 of
Iran's nuclear centrifuges and helped delay, though not destroy,
Tehran's ability to make its first nuclear arms.").
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17.

Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jun. 7,
2010,
12:00
AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-andarts/75262/the-new-vulnerability?page=032Cl
(discussing
the
applicability of Kahn's proposition to computer networks).

18.

See Patricia Donovan, Cyberwars: Already Underway with No Geneva
Conventions to Guide Them, UNIV. OF BUFFALO NEWSCTR. (Oct. 14,
2010), http://www.buffalo.edu/news/11862 ("But unlike conventional
warfare, there is nothing remotely close to the Geneva Conventions for
cyberwar. There are no boundaries in place and no protocols that set
the standards in international law for how such wars can and cannot be
waged.").
Antonio

Segura-Serrano,

Internet

Regulation

and

the

Role

of

~~ternational Law, 10 MAX ~LANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 191, 221 (2006)

( Because of the novelty of this threat ... the question arises whether
an actual Internet attack ... might come within the terms of Arts 2 (4)
and 39 of the UN Charter, triggering collective action and possibly
allowing the right of self-defense.").
20.

Id. at 233 (describing how the Common Heritage of Mankind has been
largely ignored by developed states, but might be applicable to Internet
usage).

21.

Id. a~ 264 ("U~der article 15 of the ICESCR, cultural rights [grant] ...
the nght to enJoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications .
. . [and] parties undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for
scientific research and creative activity. Alternatively, this right of
access may form part of the right to education, protected by articles 13
and 14.").
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aggressor has to find only one crucial weakness; the defender has to
find all of them, and in advance. "17
Since cyberattacks can be incredibly dangerous, it is important to
consider the legality of potential prophylactic measures. Some
guidance may exist in international law. The provisions of the
Geneva Conventions do not adequately address the modern-day issues
posed by cyberwarfare and thus fail to serve as a relevant legal
18
framework. Articles 2(4) and 39 of the United Nations Charter may
provide a lawful basis for defense of cross-border cyberattacks. 19
Alternatively, .the international law doctrine known as the Common
Heritage of Mankind, which is based on the right of freedom of
expression, may protect the public from governmental interference in
the ability to use the Internet. 20 The alleged right to Internet
connectivity may also be derived from Article 15, Paragraph 3 of the
International Covenant on Economic,. Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICES CR), which protects the freedom of scientific research and
creative activity, and under Articles 13 and 14, which guarantee the
right to education. 21
Still, international legal provisions do not answer the question of
how the United States can protect itself from cyberattacks under
domestic law. Over a hundred foreign intelligence organizations have

19.

JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET. VOL.

attempted to infiltrate American computer networks, 22 demonstrating
the need for the U.S. to prepare technological and le~al de~enses. to
Article first
counter the se attacks ' such as the kill switch. This
.
.
res the frameworks through which other countnes have used kill
lo
exp
.
. .
'
.. t
d
switches to disconnect thelf citizens Internet conn~ctivi y, ~n
subsequently examines the legality of the United State implementrng
and utilizing a kill switch.
C.

Contextual Examples

The most noteworthy use of a kill switch occurred in the
relatively recent watershed events in Egypt, which has been regarded
as "unprecedented in Internet history. "23 Activists in Egypt u~ed
social network websites, such as Twitter and Facebook, to orgamze
protests. 24 The Egyptian government a~te~pted t~ _cease activists'
ability to communicate and to organize dissident political movements
by barring access to specific targeted websites. 25 In its failed attem~t
to protect its reigning government, the Egyptian government act~d rn
a manner previously considered "unthinkable for any country with a
major Internet economy. "26 The government contacted each of the
country's four major ISPs, and "[a]n engineer at each ISP would then
access the ISP's routers, which contain a list of all the IP addresses,
thus cutting off anyone who wants to access them from within or
outside the country. "27 The ISP connector that supports Egypt's
stock exchange, Noor Group, continued to function, but nearly all of
the rest of the ISPs complied with the government's order to change

22.

Lynn, supra note 14 ("[M]ore than 100 foreign intelligence organizations
are trying to break into U.S. networks. Some governments a~eady h~ve
the capacity to disrupt elements of the U.S. mformat10n
infrastructure.").

23.

The Day That Egypt Unplugged the Internet, WSJ BLOGS: DISPATCH
(Jan.
28,
2011,
11:29
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2011/01/28/the-day-that-egyptunplugged-the-internet /.

24.

See Knowles, supra note 2 ("As was witnessed Thursday in Egypt, the
embattled government acted to shut down the Internet as
demonstrations fueled by social networking sites like Facebook and
Twitter threatened to overwhelm the ruling party.").

25.

See id.

26.

The Day that Egypt Unplugged the Internet, supra note 29.

27.

See Paul Lilly, How Egypt's Internet Kill Switch Works, MAXIMUM PC
(Jan.
31,
2011,
9:18 .
~M),
http://www.maximumpc.com/article/news/how_egypts_mternet_kill_
switch_works.
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17.

Jack Goldsmith, The New Vulnerability, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jun. 7,
2010,
12:00
AM),
http://www.tnr.com/article/books-andarts /75262/the-new-vulnerability?page=032C1
(discussing
the
applicability of Kahn's proposition to computer networks).

18.

See Patricia Donovan, Cyberwars: Already Underway with No Geneva
Conventions to Guide Them, UNIV. OF BUFFALO NEWSCTR. (Oct. 14,
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consider the legality of potential prophylactic measures. Some
guidance may exist in international law. The provisions of the
Geneva Conventions do not adequately address the modern-day issues
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fram~work. Articles 2(4) and 39 of the United Nations Charter may
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19.
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switches to disconnect their citizens Internet connectivity, and
subsequently examines the legality of the United State implementing
and utilizing a kill switch.
C.

Contextual Examples

The most noteworthy use of a kill switch occurred in the
relatively recent watershed events in Egypt, which has been regarded
as "unprecedented in Internet history. "23 Activists in Egypt used
social network websites, such as Twitter and Facebook, to organize
protests. 24 The Egyptian government attempted to cease activists'
ability to communicate and to organize dissident political movements
by barring access to specific targeted websites. 25 In its failed attempt
to protect its reigning government, the Egyptian government acted in
a manner previously considered "unthinkable for any country with a
major Internet economy. "26 The government contacted each of the
country's four major ISPs, and "[a]n engineer at each ISP would then
access the ISP's routers, which contain a list of all the IP addresses,
thus cutting off anyone who wants to access them from within or
outside the country. "27 The ISP connector that supports Egypt's
stock exchange, Noor Group, continued to function, but nearly all of
the rest of the ISPs complied with the government's order to change

22.

Lynn, supra note 14 (" [M]ore than 100 foreign intelligence organizations
are trying to break into U.S. networks. Some governments already have
the capacity to disrupt elements of the U.S. information
infrastructure.").

23.

The Day That Egypt Unplugged the Internet, WSJ BLOGS: DISPATCH
(Jan.
28,
2011,
11:29
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2011/01/28/the-day-that-egyptunplugged-the-internet /.

24.

See Knowles, supra note 2 ("As was witnessed Thursday in Egypt, the
embattled government acted to shut down the Internet as
demonstrations fueled by social networking sites like Facebook and
Twitter threatened to overwhelm the ruling party.").

25.

See id.

26.

The Day that Egypt Unplugged the Internet, supra note 29.

27.

See Paul Lilly, How Egypt's Internet Kill Switch Works, MAXIMUM PC
(Jan.
31,
2011,
9:18 .
~M),
http://www.maximumpc.com/article/news/how_egypts_mternet_k1ll_
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the "lines of code," and consequently disabled the majority of Egypt's
Internet connectivity. 28
Egypt is not the only country that has disabled its inhabitants'
ability to connect to the Internet. Nepal and Burma have both
experienced intranational government Internet shutdowns. 29
In
response to the Egyptian upnsmg, Chinese officials blocked
information relating to the Egyptian revolt from its estimated four
hundred and fifty-seven million Internet users. 30 On a broader scale
the Chinese government completely disabled Internet connectivity in'
the Xinjiang region in 2009 following dissident political activity. 31
These aforementioned international examples demonstrate that
foreign governments have been successful, at least to a noteworthy
degree, in disabling or limiting Internet use within their own borders.
However, even if the United States had the ability to disable Internet
access within its borders, it is unclear whether it would be legally able
to do so, given the Nation's rich history of protecting free speech arid
upholding the separation of powers. Arguably, the Internet is itself a
distinctly American concept, built upon the "freedom of information
and free flows of data. "32 Measures to constrict this freedom should
be critically evaluated, even when balanced against the importance of
safeguarding national security.

28.

See id. ("[S]ome 93 percent of Egyptian networks have been taken
offline. There's at least one major ISP -- Noor Group -- up and running,
the same one that hosts Egypt's stock exchange.").

29.

See Jonathan Zittrain and Molly Sauter, Will the U.S. Get an Internet
"Kill
Switch"?,
TECH.
REV.
(Mar.
4,
2011),
http:/ /www.technologyreview.com/web/32451/?mod=chfeatured&a=f
(describing the brief internet shut-downs in Nepal in 2005 and Burma in
2007).

30.

See Jeremy Page, Beijing Blocks Protest Reports, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31,
2011),
.
.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704832704576113810779
590744.html ("China's state media have provided limited coverage of
the unrest in Egypt, including the scores of reported deaths, the cutting
of Internet and cellphone access, and President Hosni Mubarak's
appointment of a vice president.").

31.

32.

See id. ("Chinese authorities also stepped up their efforts to control the
Internet after the 'color revolutions' in the former Soviet Union in 200305, and the pro-democracy protests in Iran in 2009. They completely
shut down Internet access in the northweiStern Chinese region of
Xinjiang for several months after riots there in 2009.").
Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 231.
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II.

THE PROPOSED "KILL SWITCH" BILL

A.

Provisions of the Bill

In 2010 legislation was introduced in the U.S. Senate specifying
the conditio~1s under which the government would have the ability to
activate a kill switch. 33 The proposed bill, "S.3480: Protecting
Cyberspace as a National Asse~ Act," 34 would grant the Presi~ ent t~e
power to disable the Internet m the event of an emergency.
This
bipartisan bill was co-sponsored by Senators on the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee: Maine Senator Susan
Collins the ranking Republican on the Committee, 36 Connecticut
Indepe~dent Senator Joseph Lieberman, the Committee Chairman,37
and Delaware Democratic Senator Tom Carper. 38
This bill, which was approved by a Senate panel, _would creat~ a
governmental agency called the National Center for Cybersecur1ty

5

33.

S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); Chloe Albanesius, Lieberman Backs
Away From "Internet Kill Switch", PC MAG (June 21, 2010, 3:19 P~),
http://
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2365393,00.asp (recountmg
that the controversy swirling around the bill "prompted many to dub
[the] option an 'Internet kill switch'"); Jon Orlin, In Search of
the Internet Kill Switch,
TECH
CRUNCH
(Mar.
6,
2011),
http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/06/in-search-of-the-internet-kill-switch/
("It became known as the Internet 'k~l switch'. ~!11 even though the
words 'kill' and 'switch' are not found m the bill. ); Matthew Schafer,
How the Internet "Kill Switch" Bill Became the Bulwark of Internet
Independence,
GROUND
REP.
(Feb.
21,
2011),
http://www.groundreport.com/Media_and_Tech/How-the-InternetKill-Switch-Bill-Became-the-Bulwa/2934942 (noting that the bill ·was
"subject to a maelstrom of controversy" after being dubbed
a kill switch); see also Declan McCullagh, Senators Propose Granting
President Emergency Internet Power, CNET NEWS (June 10, 2010, 8:25
PM),
http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20007418-~8.html
(recognizing "few limits on the presi~ent'~ emergency power, wh1ch"can
be renewed indefinitely," and notmg mdustry concerns over the
potential for absolute power.").

34.

S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); see Meredith Jessup, Committee
Passes Plan for Internet "Kill Switch" in Egypt- U.S., THEBLAZE (Jan.
29, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/committee-passesplan-for-internet-kill-switch-in-egypt-u-s /.

35.

S. 3480 § 249; see Knowles, supra note 2 ("Championed by Sen. Joe
Lieberman the bill would give President Barack Obama . . . control to
snuff out 'the Internet in one fell swoop during a so-called. "cyberemergency[.] ").

36.

Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status 111th Congress {2009(last
· visited
Oct.
2010)
S.3480
Cosponsors
17,
2012), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl l l:SN03480:@@@P.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.
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the "lines of code," and consequently disabled the majority of Egypt's
Internet connectivity. 28
Egypt is not the only country that has disabled its inhabitants'
ability to connect to the Internet. Nepal and Burma have both
experienced intranational government Internet shutdowns. 29
In
response to the Egyptian upnsmg, Chinese officials blocked
information relating to the Egyptian revolt from its estimated four
hundred and fifty-seven million Internet users. 30 On a broader scale,
the Chinese government completely disabled Internet connectivity in
the Xinjiang region in 2009 following dissident political activity. 31
These aforementioned international examples demonstrate that
foreign governments have been successful, at least to a noteworthy
degree, in disabling or limiting Internet use within their own borders.
However, even if the United States had the ability to disable Internet
access within its borders, it is unclear whether it would be legally able
to do so, given the Nation's rich history of protecting free speech and
upholding the separation of powers. Arguably, the Internet is itself a
distinctly American concept, built upon the "freedom of information
and free flows of data. "32 Measures to constrict this freedom should
be critically evaluated, even when balanced against the importance of
safeguarding national security.

28.

See id. ("[S]ome 93 percent of Egyptian networks have been taken
offline. There's at least one major ISP -- Noor Group -- up and running,
the same one that hosts Egypt's stock exchange.").

29.

See Jonathan Zittrain and Molly Sauter, Will the U.S. Get an Internet
"Kill
Switch"?,
TECH.
REV.
(Mar.
4,
2011),
http://www.technologyreview.com/web/32451/?mod=chfeatured&a=f
(describing the brief internet shut-downs in Nepal in 2005 and Burma in
2007).

30.

See Jeremy Page, Beijing Blocks Protest Reports, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31,
2011),
.
.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704832704576113810779
590744.html ("China's state media have provided limited coverage of
the unrest in Egypt, including the scores of reported deaths, the cutting
of Internet and cellphone access, and President Hosni Mubarak's
appointment of a vice president.").

31.

32.

See id. ("Chinese authorities also stepped up their efforts to control the
Internet after the 'color revolutions' in the former Soviet Union in 200305, and the pro-democracy protests in Iran in 2009. They completely
shut down Internet access in the northwe::;tern Chinese region of
Xinjiang for several months after riots there in 2009. ").
Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 231.
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II.

THE PROPOSED "KILL SWITCH" BILL

A.

Provisions of the Bill

In 2010, legislation was introduced in the U.S. Senate specifying
the conditions under which the government would have the ability to
activate a kill switch. 33 The proposed bill, "S.3480: Protecting
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act," 34 would grant the President the
power to disable the Internet in the event of an emergency. 35 This
bipartisan bill was co-sponsored by Senators on the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee: Maine Senator Susan
Collins, the ranking Republican on the Committee, 36 Connecticut
Independent Senator Joseph Lieberman, the Committee Chairman,37
and Delaware Democratic Senator Tom Carper. 38
This bill, which was approved by a Senate panel, _would create a
governmental agency called the National Center for Cybersecurity
33.

S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); Chloe Albanesius, Lieberman Backs
Away From "Internet Kill Switch", PC MAG (June 21, 2010, 3:19 P~),
http://
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2365393,00.asp (recountmg
that the controversy swirling around the bill "prompted many to dub
[the] option an 'Internet kill switch"'); Jon Orlin, In Search of
the Internet Kill Switch,
TECH
CRUNCH
(Mar.
6,
2011),
http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/06/in-search-of-the-internet-kill-switch/
("It became known as the Internet 'kill switch' bill even though the
words 'kill' and 'switch' are not found in the bill."); Matthew Schafer,
How the Internet "Kill Switch" Bill Became the Bulwark of Internet
Independence,
GROUND
REP.
(Feb.
21,
2011),
http://www.groundreport.com/Media_and_Tech/How-the-Inter~et-.

Kill-Switch-Bill-Became-the-Bulwa/2934942 (notmg that the bill was
"subject to a maelstrom of controversy" after being dubbed
a kill switch); see also Declan McCullagh, Senators Propose Granting
President Emergency Internet Power, CNET NEWS (June 10, 2010, 8:25
PM),
http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20007418-~8.html
(recognizing "few limits on the president's emergency power, which can
be renewed indefinitely," and noting industry concerns over "the
potential for absolute power.").
34.

S. 3480 § 249, lllth Cong. (2010); see Meredith Jessup, Committee
Passes Plan for Internet "Kill Switch" in Egypt- U.S., THE BLAZE (Jan.
29, 2011, 1:52 PM), http:/ /www.theblaze.com/stories/committee-passesplan-for-internet-kill-switch-in-egypt-u-s /.

35.

S. 3480 § 249; see Knowles, supra note 2 ("Championed by Sen. Joe
Lieberman, the bill would give President Barack Obama . . . control to
snuff out the Internet in one fell swoop during a so-called. "cyberemergency[.] ").

36.

Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status 111th Congress {2009(last
· visited
Oct.
2010)
S.3480
Cosponsors
17,
2012), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 11 :SN03480:@@@P.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.
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and Communications ("NCCC"). 39 The NCCC, which would operate
under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security, 40 would
have the broad power to control the Internet, including the ability to
shut down the web for a 30-day period. 41 The proposed agency would
"oversee the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which
disseminates cybersecurity information from researchers and the
government to the private sector. "42 This bill would also create a
White House Office of Cyberspace Policy to supervise all "instruments
of national power relating to ensuring the security and resiliency of
cyberspace," and enforce security standards governing the public and
private sector established by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). 43
No one yet understands the bill's full possible ramifications. In
fact, it may not be realistically feasible to implement, as the United
States has more decentralized ISPs than Egypt. 44 As a result of
public outrage over the pending legislation, the new draft of the 221page bill explicitly forbids the government from entirely disconnecting
a user's computer from the Intemet. 45 The proposed bill stipulates
that the President would have the power to shut down "critical
infrastructure" during a devastating cyberattack on the country, or in
39.

S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); see Jessup, supra note 34.

anticipation of such an attack. 46 This bill calls for the Department of
Homeland Security to establish and maintain a list of systems or
assets that constitute critical cyber-infrastructure. 47 The Department
would also be authorized to take action against privately-owned
The proposed legislation precludes judicial
computer systems. 48
review for critical infrastructure, and requires the President to consult
Congress before taking action. 49
The breadth of power that the proposed bill facially imparts is
not without serious checks. According to Senator Lieberman, the
legislation is limited to protecting only "the most critical
infrastructures that Americans rely on in their daily lives-energy
transmission, water supply, [and] financial services[.]" 50 The President
may be precluded from taking action pursuant to the bill unless a
cyberattack would cause more than twenty-five billion dollars in
damages in the span of a year, kill more than 2,500 people, and force
mass evacuations. 51 Under the bill, the Executive's emergency actions
are only authorized for thirty days, with potential thirty-day
extensions. 52
These drastic restrictions make the possibility of action pursuant
to the bill rather unlikely, or so one hopes. In order to constitute the
kind of emergency covered by the proposed bill, the danger would
need to be "a massive computer-virus or physical attack in which

40.

S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (describing the
structure of the proposed National Center for Cybersecurity and
Communications).

46.

41.

S. 3480, § 249(b)(l); Jessup, supra note 34.

42.

S. 3480 § 244; Zittrain. and Sauter, supra note 29.

43.

S. 3480 § 102(b) (9) ("The Director shall . . . . coordinate and ensure to
the maximum extent practicable, that the standards and guidellnes
developed for national security systems and the standards and guidelines
under section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) are complementary and unified.").

S. 3480 § 249(a)(l); Suzanne Phan, Egypt Flips Internet Kill Switch,
Congress Considers Similar Bill, NEWSlO ABC (Feb. 2, 2011, 11:35
AM),
http://www.news10.net/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=l20886&provide
r=top ("[The Bill] wouldn't allow the president to actually shut down
the Internet. But it would give him the ability to shut down 'critical
infrastructure' if there was ever a serious cyber attack on the country.").

47.

Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 210E(a)(2)
1241(a)(2); Jessup, supra note 34.

codified 6 U.S.C.

44.

Jessup, supra note 34 ("The U.S. telecommunication industry is much
more ~omp!e:X: a~d far more decentralized [than Egypt's]. To do
somethmg s1m1lar m the U.S. would require a lot more than four phone
calls.").

48.

S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The 221-page
bill hands Homeland Security the power to issue decrees to certain
privately owned computer systems after the president declares a
"national cyberemergency. ").

45.

S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see Declan McCullagh Internet "Kill Switch"
Bill Gets a Makeover, CNET (Feb.
2011, 6:27 PM),
htt~://n~ws.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20033717-281.html (describing the
revised bill and its potential ramifications); see also Zittrain and Sauter,
supra note 29 (stating that critical infrastructure protected by the bill is
narrowly defined as "systems whose 'disruption or destruction would
caus~ ~ mass casualty ~vent which includes an extraordinary number of
fatalities; severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a
proior:~e? ~bsenc~; or severe degradation of national security
capabilities, mcludmg intelligence and defense functions.' . . . . most
Web servers would not qualify as that type of infrastructure------nor
would a small ISP.").

49.

Swartz, supra note 9.

50.

McCullagh, supra note 45.

51.

Id. (describing how Senators "hope" that Homeland Security will take a
combination of these types of factors into consideration before utilizing
the kill switch, however, these restraints are "nonbinding and [do not]
actually appear in the legislation."); see also Swartz, supra note 9
(stating that the bill specifically does not grant the President power to
act unless these factors are met, and the President would be empowered
to "pinpoint what to clamp down on without causing economic damage
to U.S. interests.").

52.

S. 3480 § 249(b)(2); see also Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29.

lB,
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and Communications ("NCCC"). 39 The NCCC, which would operate
under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security, 40 would
have the broad power to control the Internet, including the ability to
shut down the web for a 30-day period. 41 The proposed agency would
"oversee the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which
disseminates cybersecurity information from researchers and the
government to the private sector. "42 This bill would also create a
White House Office of Cyberspace Policy to supervise all "instruments
of national power relating to ensuring the security and resiliency of
cyberspace," and enforce security standards governing the public and
private sector established by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).43
No one yet understands the bill's full possible ramifications. In
fact, it may not be realistically feasible to implement, as the United
States has more decentralized ISPs than Egypt. 44 As a result of
public outrage over the pending legislation, the new draft of the 221page bill explicitly forbids the government from entirely disconnecting
a user's computer from the Internet. 45 The proposed bill stipulates
that the President would have the power to shut down "critical
infrastructure" during a devastating cyberattack on the country, or in
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39.

S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); see Jessup, supra note 34.

anticipation of such an attack. 46 This bill calls for the Department of
Homeland Security to establish and maintain a list of systems or
assets that constitute critical cyber-infrastructure. 47 The Department
would also be authorized to take action against privately-owned
computer systems. 48
The proposed legislation precludes judicial
review for critical infrastructure, and requires the President to consult
Congress before taking action. 49
The breadth of power that the proposed bill facially imparts is
not without serious checks. According to Senator Lieberman, the
legislation is limited to protecting only "the most critical
infrastructures that Americans rely on in their daily lives-energy
transmission, water supply, [and] financial services[.]" 50 The President
may be precluded from taking action pursuant to the bill unless a
cyberattack would cause more than twenty-five billion dollars in
damages in the span of a year, kill more than 2,500 people, and force
mass evacuations. 51 Under the bill, the Executive's emergency actions
are only authorized for thirty days, with potential thirty-day
extensions. 52
These drastic restrictions make the possibility of action pursuant
to the bill rather unlikely, or so one hopes. In order to constitute the
kind of emergency covered by the proposed bill, the danger would
need to be "a massive computer-virus or physical attack in which

40.

S. 3480 § 242(a)(l); Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (describing the
structure of the proposed National Center for Cybersecurity and
Communications).

46.

41.

S. 3480, § 249(b)(l); Jessup, supra note 34.

42.

S. 3480 § 244; Zittrain. and Sauter, supra note 29.

43.

S. 3480 § 102(b) (9) ("The Director shall . . . . coordinate and ensure, to
the maximum extent practicable, that the standards and guidelines
developed for national security systems and the standards and guidelines
under section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) are complementary and unified.").

S. 3480 § 249(a)(l); Suzanne Phan, Egypt Flips Internet Kill Switch,
Congress Considers Similar Bill, NEWSlO ABC (Feb. 2, 2011, 11:35
AM),
http://www.newslO.net/ news/local/ story .aspx?storyid= 120886&provide
r=top ("[The Bill] wouldn't allow the president to actually shut down
the Internet. But it would give him the ability to shut down 'critical
infrastructure' if there was ever a serious cyber attack on the country.").

47.

Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 210E(a)(2)
1241(a)(2); Jessup, supra note 34.

codified 6 U.S.C.

44.

Jessup, supra note 34 ("The U.S. telecommunication industry is much
more ~omp!eX: a~d far more decentralized [than Egypt's]. To do
somethmg similar m the U.S. would require a lot more than four phone
calls.").

48.

S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The 221-page
bill hands Homeland Security the power to issue decrees to certain
privately owned computer systems after the president declares a
"national cyberemergency.").

45.

S. 3480 § 249(a)(3)(A); see Declan McCullagh Internet ((Kill Switch"
Bill Gets a Makeover, CNET (Feb. lS, 2011, 6:27 PM),
htt:p://n~ws.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20033717-281.html (describing the
revised bill and its potential ramifications); see also Zittrain and Sauter,
supra note 29 (stating that critical infrastructure protected by the bill is
narrowly defined as "systems whose 'disruption or destruction would
caus~ ~ mass casualty ~vent which includes an extraordinary number of
fatabties; severe economic consequences; mass evacuations with a
prolor:~e~ ~bsenc~; or severe degradation of national security
capabibties, mcludmg intelligence and defense functions.' . . . . most
Web servers would not qualify as that type of infrastructure-·--·nor
would a small ISP.'').

49.

Swartz, supra note 9.

50.

McCullagh, supra note 45.

51.

Id. (describing how Senators "hope" that Homeland Security will take a
combination of these types of factors into consideration before utilizing
the kill switch, however, these restraints are "nonbinding and [do not]
actually appear in the legislation."); see also Swartz, supra note 9
(stating that the bill specifically does not grant the President power to
act unless these factors are met, and the President would be empowered
to "pinpoint what to clamp down on without causing economic damage
to U.S. interests.").

52.

S. 3480 § 249(b)(2); see also Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29.
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ISPs stood idly by as malware spread like wildfire. "53 This makes the
realistic necessity of enforcing the bill unclear. In the event of a
catastrophe rising to the level specified in the proposed legislation, it
is unlikely that governmental action would be able to mitigate the
situation. ISPs would likely take measures on their own to counter
any such adumbrated disasters, and arguably, the ISP's engineers
would already be in a better position to take action than the
government. 54 Yet the bill's extra protection, even if never used, may
be critical in the remote likelihood that a catastrophic event occurs
and the ISPs are either unable or unwilling to take action. 55

Cyberattack." 60
Notably, in congressional testimony, Phillip
Reitinger, the former Deputy Undersecretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, stated that "Congress and the Administration
should work together to identify any needed adjustments to the [1934]
Act, as opposed to developing overlapping legislation. "61
The Founding Fathers' caution towards the power of the federal
government is reflected in the spirit of the Constitution. 62 Each
branch is limited to the powers bestowed upon it by the Constitution,
in a system of checks and balances. The Constitution imbues each of
the three branches of government with inherent but limited powers.
Article 1 imbues the Legislature with power; 63 Article 2, the
Executive; 64 and Article 3, the Judiciary. 65 In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson's concurring opinion demarcated
a tripartite model of the separation of powers, stipulating that the
Executive's powers are at their strongest when supported by the
explicit authority of the legislature. 66 Under this constitutional
analysis,, the President's authority to disable Internet connectivity
should the kill switch bill become law is likely justified under the
powers delineated in Article I and Article II, in conjunction with
Section 706 of the 1934 Act.
However, the constitutional rights afforded to citizens must
continue to check the breadth of the Executive's powers, which

B.

The Legality of the "Kill Switch" Bill

1.

The Power of the Executive Branch

The President may already possess the necessary authority to
shut down Internet's infrastructure without resorting to using the
powers conferred by the proposed bill. 56 Under section 706 of the
Communications Act of 1934, pursuant to a provision added in 1941,
the President has the power to shut down "any facility or station for
Thus, theoretically the President may
wire communication. "57
lawfully take control of these infrastructures if a triggering event
causes a "state of war." 58 In the wake of such an event, the federal
government may control these facilities for up to six months. 59 The
Department of Homeland Security has cited section 706 as "one of the
authorities the President would rely on if the nation were under a

60.

Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (indicating that this may be the case,
although the "War Congress of 1941 wasn't thinking about the
Internet," when they wrote this provision).

53.

Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29.

61.

54.

Id. (in the event of a massive attack "it's not clear that government
intervention would make any difference. The ISPs would already be
doing everything they could to counter the attack. And there's no
reason to believe that the government would have any comparative
advantage in understanding the situation better than the Internet
engineers themselves.").

Paul Rosenzweig, The Internet "Kill Switch" Debate, LAWFARE, (Feb. 2,
2012, 11:10 AM), http:/ /www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/the-internetkill-switch-debate/.

62.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The idea of
restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the
national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a
zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened.").

55.

See id. (describing how ISPs would be better suited to deal with a
cyberattack,which leads to the inference that the government may only
need to act if the ISPs are unable or unwilling to do so).

63.

U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives.").

56.

Id.

64.

57.

Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain
and Sauter, supra note 29 ("Section 706 of the Communications of Act
of 1934-written into the Act shortly after the 1941 attack on Pearl
Harbor-gives the President the power to shut down "any facility or
station for wire communication" or take federal control of such facilities
in the event of a "state of war" and for up to six months after the
expiration of such a state.").

U.S. CONST. art. 2 § 1 (''The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.").

65.

U.S. CONST. art. 3 § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").

66.

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the three-part test for
presidential power, and stating that "[w]hen the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate.").

58.

Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29.

59.

Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain
and Sauter, supra note 29.
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ISPs stood idly by as malware spread like wildfire. "53 This makes the
realistic necessity of enforcing the bill unclear. In the event of a
catastrophe rising to the level specified in the proposed legislation, it
is unlikely that governmental action would be able to mitigate the
situation. ISPs would likely take measures on their own to counter
any such adumbrated disasters, and arguably, the ISP's engineers
would already be in a better position to take action than the
government. 54 Yet the bill's extra protection, even if never used, may
be critical in the remote likelihood that a catastrophic event occurs
and the ISPs are either unable or unwilling to take action. 55

Cyberattack. "60
Notably, in congressional testimony, Phillip
Reitinger, the former Deputy Undersecretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, stated that "Congress and the Administration
should work together to identify any needed adjustments to the [1934]
Act, as opposed to developing overlapping legislation. "61
The Founding Fathers' caution towards the power of the federal
government is reflected in the spirit of the Constitution. 62 Each
branch is limited to the powers bestowed upon it by the Constitution,
in a system of checks and balances. The Constitution imbues each of
the three branches of government with inherent but limited powers.
Article 1 imbues the Legislature with power; 63 Article 2, the
Executive; 64 and Article 3, the Judiciary. 65 In Youngstown Sheet f:J
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson's concurring opinion demarcated
a tripartite model of the separation of powers, stipulating that the
Executive's powers are at their strongest when supported by the
explicit authority of the legislature. 66
Under this constitutional
analysis,, the President's authority to disable Internet connectivity
should the kill switch bill become law is likely justified under the
powers delineated in Article I and Article II, in conjunction with
Section 706 of the 1934 Act.
However, the constitutional rights afforded to citizens must
continue· to check the breadth of the Executive's powers, which

B.

The Legality of the "Kill Switch" Bill

1.

The Power of the Executive Branch

The President may already possess the necessary authority to
shut down Internet's infrastructure without resorting to using the
powers conferred by the proposed bill. 56 Under section 706 of the
Communications Act of 1934, pursuant to a provision added in 1941,
the President has the power to shut down "any facility or station for
Thus, theoretically the President may
wire communication. "57
lawfully take control of these infrastructures if a triggering event
causes a "state of war. "58 In the wake of such an event, the federal
government may control these facilities for up to six months. 59 The
Department of Homeland Security has cited section 706 as "one of the
authorities the President would rely on if the nation were under a

53.

Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29.

54.

Id. (in the event of a massive attack "it's not clear that government
intervention would make any difference. The ISPs would already be
doing everything they could to counter the attack. And there's no
reason to believe that the government would have any comparative
advantage in understanding the situation better than the Internet
engineers themselves.").

55.

See id. (describing how ISPs would be better suited to deal with a
cyberattack,which leads to the inference that the government may only
need to act if the ISPs are unable or unwilling to do so).

56.

Id.

57.

Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain
and Sauter, supra note 29 ("Section 706 of the Communications of Act
of 1934-written into the Act shortly after the 1941 attack on Pearl
Harbor-gives the President the power to shut down "any facility or
station for wire communication" or take federal control of such facilities
in the event of a "state of war" and for up to six months after the
expiration of such a state.").

58.

Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29.

59.

Communications Act of 1934 § 706; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d)(2011); Zittrain
and Sauter, supra note 29.

68

60.

Zittrain and Sauter, supra note 29 (indicating that this may be the case,
although the "War Congress of 1941 wasn't thinking about the
Internet," when they wrote this provision).

61.

Paul Rosenzweig, The Internet "Kill Switch" Debate, LAWFARE, (Feb. 2,
2012, 11:10 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/the-internetkill-switch-debate/.

62.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The idea of
restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the
national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a
zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened.").

63.

U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives.").

64.

U.S. CONST. art. 2 § 1 (''The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.").

65.

U.S. CONST. art. 3 § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").

66.

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
( 1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the three-part test for
presidential power, and stating that "[w]hen the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate.").
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expand in times of danger and warfare. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that an enemy combatant must
receive notice of the allegations against him; however, the government
may tailor these proceedings to help alleviate the burden that this
type of trial places on the government. 67 The plurality stressed the
need to balance governmental concerns with those of individuals. 68
The Hamdi Court stated that "history and common sense" 69 have
demonstrated that "war is not a blank check" 70 to encroach on the
separation of powers by disproportionately strengthening the power of
the Executive. 71
When considering the proposed kill switch bill under the
provisions of Hamdi, it is clear that individual rights limit the
Executive's powers, even in the case of exigent circumstances.
However, Hamdi does not delineate the extent to which the
Executive's powers can be strengthened in a time of peril or when
exactly that peril is sufficient to justify otherwise extra-legal action.
While the proposed terms of the kill switch bill include a high
threshold of collateral damage to trigger the Executive's interference
with Internet connectivity, some might argue that the resulting broad
Executive Powers would be a "blank check" forbidden under Hamdi.
If just one keystroke can render severe damage, how high would the
corresponding likelihood of the attack need to be in order to trigger
the powers of the kill switch bill?
Justices Souter, in his Hamdi concurrence, emphasized that the
Executive branch must confine use of its emergency powers unless

supported by specific instances of emergencies. 72 However, in the age
of the Internet, the question becomes how the Government can
determine whether a specific emergency is occurring, when many
cyberattacks may occur simultaneously. Given the ease and speed in
which attacks can be perpetrated, it may be unrealistic for the
Executive Branch to ask Congress for permission to act or consult
with the Attorney General regarding the legality of the intended
measures.

67.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) ("We therefore hold that a
citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification[.]
. . . [E]nemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict.").

68.

Id. at 536-37 (noting that "it would turn our system of checks and
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention").

69.

Id. at 530 ("[H]istory and common sense teach us that an unchecked
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for
oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat.").

70.

Id. at 536 ("We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nations' citizens.").

71.

Id. ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for
all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.").

70

2.

i.

Protections Granted by the First Amendment

The Individual Right

In addition to implicating the scope of the Executive power, the
kill switch bill may impede on an individual's First Amendment right
to post content on the Internet. 73 As the measures proposed by the
bill would allow the NCCC to shut down the Internet for a thirty-day
period, 74 these, concerns also may encompass the ability of Americans
to access another person's writing. For example, nearly sixty percent
of Americans access the news from their computers. 75
Many civil rights organizations have questioned the kill switch
bill's effect on American freedom and civil liberties. 76 The American
Civil Liberty Union's legislative counsel, Michelle Richardson, claimed
that the issue surrounding the proposed bill was never that a literal
kill switch could eviscerate Internet access completely. 77 Richardson
explained that "[t]he question is bigger than that. It's generally, can
the government interfere with communications ... The question i~:
Are there significant protections in there?" 78 Similarly, the Electromc
Frontier Foundation's legal director and general counsel, Cindy Cohn,
stated that what happened in Egypt "highlights the dangers of any

72.

Id. at 541 (Souter, J. concurring) (noting that in the absence of a
specific reason for detention, the detainee, in the matter at hand, may
be entitled to release).

73.

See Jessup, supra note 34 (noting the concern that various interest
groups have voiced that "the measure, if it became law, might be used
to censor the internet").

74.

S. 3480 § 242; see Jessup, supra note 34.

75.

Jessup, supra note 34 ("at least 603 of Americans get their daily news
from the Internet.").

76.

Id. ("About two dozen groups, including the American Civil Liberties
Union
the American Library Association, Electronic Frontier
Foundation and Center for Democracy &Technology, were skeptical
enough to file an open letter opposing the idea.").

77.

McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The ACLU's Richardson believes the
problem was never a 'kill switch."').

78.

Id.
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expand in times of danger and warfare. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, the
Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that an enemy combatant must
receive notice of the allegations against him; however, the government
may tailor these proceedings to help alleviate the burden that this
type of trial places on the government. 67 The plurality stressed the
need to balance governmental concerns with those of individuals. 68
The Hamdi Court stated that "history and common sense" 69 have
demonstrated that "war is not a blank check" 70 to encroach on the
separation of powers by disproportionately strengthening the power of
the Executive. 71
When considering the proposed kill switch bill under the
provisions of Hamdi, it is clear that individual rights limit the
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However, H amdi does not delineate the extent to which the
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threshold of collateral damage to trigger the Executive's interference
with Internet connectivity, some might argue that the resulting broad
Executive Powers would be a "blank check" forbidden under Hamdi.
If just one keystroke can render severe damage, how high would the
corresponding likelihood of the attack need to be in order to trigger
the powers of the kill switch bill?
Justices Souter, in his Hamdi concurrence, emphasized that the
Executive branch must confine use of its emergency powers unless

supported by specific instances of emergencies. 72 However, in the age
of the Internet, the question becomes how the Government can
determine whether a specific emergency is occurring, when many
cyberattacks may occur simultaneously. Given the ease and speed in
which attacks can be perpetrated, it may be unrealistic for the
Executive Branch to ask Congress for permission to act or consult
with the Attorney General regarding the legality of the intended
measures.

67.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) ("We therefore hold that a
citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification[.]
. . . [E]nemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing
military conflict.").

68.

Id. at 536-37 (noting that "it would turn our system of checks and
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention").

69.

Id. at 530 ("[H]istory and common sense teach us that an unchecked
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for
oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat.").

70.

Id. at 536 ("We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nations' citizens.").

71.

Id. ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for
all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.").

70
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i.

Protections Granted by the First Amendment

The Individual Right

In addition to implicating the scope of the Executive power, the
kill switch bill may impede on an individual's First Amendment right
to post content on the Internet. 73 As the measures proposed by the
bill would allow the NCCC to shut down the Internet for a thirty-day
period, 74 these, concerns also may encompass the ability of Americans
to access another person's writing. For example, nearly sixty percent
of Americans access the news from their computers. 75
Many civil rights organizations have questioned the kill switch
bill's effect on American freedom and civil liberties. 76 The American
Civil Liberty Union's legislative counsel, Michelle Richardson, claimed
that the issue surrounding the proposed bill was never that a literal
kill switch could eviscerate Internet access completely. 77 Richardson
explained that "[t]he question is bigger than that. It's generally, can
the government interfere with communications ... The question i~:
Are there significant protections in there?" 78 Similarly, the Electromc
Frontier Foundation's legal director and general counsel, Cindy Cohn,
stated that what happened in Egypt "highlights the dangers of any

72.

Id. at 541 (Souter, J. concurring) (noting that in the absence of a
specific reason for detention, the detainee, in the matter at hand, may
be entitled to release).

73.

See Jessup, supra note 34 (noting the concern that various interest
groups have voiced that "the measure, if it became law, might be used
to censor the internet").

74.

S. 3480 § 242; see Jessup, supra note 34.

75.

Jessup, supra note 34 ("at least 603 of Americans get their daily news
from the Internet.").

76.

Id. ("About two dozen groups, including the American Civil Liberties
Union
the American Library Association, Electronic Frontier
Foundation and Center for Democracy &Technology, were skeptical
enough to file an open letter opposing the idea.").

77.

McCullagh, supra note 45 ("The ACLU's Richardson believes the
problem was never a 'kill switch."').
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The issue then becomes whether there are grounds for these
concerns, and to what extent the Constitution protects a citizen's
First Amendment freedom of speech and expression in regard to the
Internet. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law.
· · abridging the freedom of speech, nso but does this text actually
prote~t the right to access the Internet? "Under th[eJ [public forum]
doctrme, U.S. courts impose on the government the affirmative
oblig~tion t? make public facilities available for persons wanting to
exercise therr free speech rights. nsi But; can the kill switch bill meet
judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment? To answer these
questions, this Article explores the case law that defines the
parameters of accepted- limitations on free speech under the First
Amendment.
·
ii.

Applicable Tests for First Amendment Limitations

In Whitney v. California, the Supreme Court held that there is no
absolute freedom of speech. s2 Whitney sets forth the standard that
state.s .do not violate an individual's Constitutional rights when they
proh1b1t speech that may "incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or
endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten the
overthrow by unlawful means. "S3 In his celebrated concurrence
Justice Brandeis expounded that freedom of speech rights ar~
"fundamental [but] they are not in their nature absolute."s4 He
stressed that "fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
79.

free speech and assembly," an~ to. justify such ~up~re~sion,. the
implicating speech must pose an 1mmment danger wh1~h 1s :elat1vely
serious. ns5 In accordance with the standard set forth m Whitney, the
kill switch bill would likely meet the necessary standards to render
First Amendment protections inapplicable. Since the Executive can
only rely upon this legislation in times of, or in the fear . of,
catastrophic calamity, the Whitney standard would almost certamly
be met if the Executive were correct in his or her assessment of the
likelihood of danger on the basis of known information at the time of
the threat.
The kill switch bill may further be proven legal pursuant to the
historical standards set forth that the government must meet before
In evaluating when
encroaching upon First Amendment rights.
dangerous conditions override First Amendment concern~, the
Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States created and applied the
"clear and present danger" test.s6 This Court noted that "[w]hen a
nation is at war many things that might be said in times of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured[.]"s 7 This allows the abridgement of free speech w~en the
resulting advocated action is one that Congress has the nght to
prevent.ss In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that
a causal link between the speech and disturbance is necessary when
abridging First Amendment rights, and that the speec~ m~st ha:e
more than a tenuous relationship to the feared repercussrnns. While
this is a common standard for evaluating the abridgement of First
Amendment rights, a dormant, yet not overruled test put forth in
Dennis v. United States, focuses on whether the "gravity of the 'evil,'

Egypt's Internet Blackout Revives U.S. "Kill Switch" Debate, HOMELAND
SEC..
NEWS
_wrRE
.
(Feb.
7,
2011),
http.// WWW .homelandsecuntynewswrre.com/egypts-internet-blackoutrevives-us-kill-.switch-debate ("The lesson of Egypt is that no one, not
even the President of the United States, should be given the power to
turn off the Internet.").

80.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

81.

Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 261.

82.
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83.

Whitney v: C~lifornia, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ("That the freedom of
s?eech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute
nght t~ speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestncted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible
use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom; and that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish
those who ~buse ~hi~ freedo~ by utterances inimical to the public
welfare, ten~mg to mc1te to crrme, disturb the public peace, or endanger
the foundations ~f organized government and threaten its overthrow by
unlawful means, is not open to question.").
Id. at 371.

84.

Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

72

85.

Id. at 376-77.

86.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ('The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.").

87.

Id.

88.

Id. ("The most stringent protection of free speec~ would. not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causmg pamc. It does not
even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the effect of force.").

89.

Cf., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393.1:LS. 50?, 5.09
(1969) ("In order for the State in. the pers?~ of s.chool officials to Justify
prohibition of a particular express10n of opm10n, it must be able to. show
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.").

73

JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET · VoL.

4 ·No. I· 2012

The Sound of Silence
government
having
infrastructure. "79

unchecked

power

over

our

Internet

Applicable Tests for First Amendment Limitations

In Whitney v. California, the Supreme Court held that there is no
absolute freedom of speech. 82 Whitney sets forth the standard that
state_s _do not violate an individual's Constitutional rights when they
prohibit speech that may "incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or
endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten the
overthrow by unlawful means. "83 In his celebrated concurrence
Justice Brandeis expounded that freedom of speech rights ar~
"fundamental [but] they are not in their nature absolute. "84 He
stressed that "fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
79.
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The issue then becomes whether there are grounds for these
concerns, and to what extent the Constitution protects a citizen's
First Amendment freedom of speech and expression in regard to the
Internet. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law.
. . abridging the freedom of speech, "80 but does this text actually
prote~t the right to ac~ess the Internet? "Under th[e] [public forum]
doctrme, U.S. courts impose on the government the affirmative
obligation to make public facilities available for persons wanting to
exercise their free speech rights. "81 But; can the kill switch bill meet
judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment? To answer these
questions, this Article explores the case law that defines the
parameters of accepted- limitations on free speech under the First
Amendment.
·
ii.
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turn off the Internet.").

free speech and assembly," and to justify such suppression, the
implicating speech must pose an imminent danger whi~h is "~elatively
serious. "85 In accordance with the standard set forth m Whitney, the
kill switch bill would likely meet the necessary standards to render
First Amendment protections inapplicable. Since the Executive can
only rely upon this legislation in times of, or in the fear . of,
catastrophic calamity, the Whitney standard would almost certamly
be met if the Executive were correct in his or her assessment of the
likelihood of danger on the basis of known information at the time of
the threat.
The kill switch bill may further be proven legal pursuant to the
historical standards set forth that the government must meet before
encroaching upon First Amendment rights.
In evaluating when
dangerous conditions override First Amendment concern~, the
Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States created and applied the
"clear and present danger" test. 86 This Court noted that "[w]hen a
nation is at war many things that might be said in times of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured[.]" 87 This allows the abridgement of free speech w~en the
resulting advocated action is one that Congress has the nght to
prevent. 88 In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that
a causal link between the speech and disturbance is necessary when
abridging First Amendment rights, and that the speec~ m~st ha:e
more than a tenuous relationship to the feared repercuss10ns. While
this is a common standard for evaluating the abridgement of First
Amendment rights, a dormant, yet not overruled test put forth in
Dennis v. United States, focuses on whether the "gravity of the 'evil,'

SEC.

80.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

81.

Segura-Serrano, supra note 19, at 261.

83.

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ("That the freedom of
speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute
right t~ speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an
unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible
use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom; and that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish
those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public
welfare, ten?ing to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger
the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by
unlawful means, is not open to question.").
Id. at 371.

84.

Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).

82.

72

85.

Id. at 376-77.

86.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ('The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. ").

87.

Id.

88.

Id. ("The most stringent protection of free speec~ would. not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causmg pamc. It does not
even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may
have all the effect of force.").

89.

Cf., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393_ 1:I.S. 50~, 5_09
(1969) ("In order for the State in_ the pers?~ of s_chool officials to Justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opimon, it must be able to_ show
that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.").
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dis~ounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as 1s necessary to avoid the danger. "90
The kill switch legislation would likely comply with the Schenck
st~ndard and meet the stringency of the conditions necessary to
tngge~ t~e Executive's power under the proposed bill. However, the
analysis 1s less cl~ar under Dennis. Although attackers may intend to
cause ~~mage senous enough to meet the first prong of the test,91 the
p~obab1lity of the danger coming from its fruition would need to be
high. en~ugh to merit resorting to the powers granted in the bill.
Consid~rmg the. ea~e with which cyberattacks can occur, the
Executive may conSider multiple attacks "probable." Thus, it is
unclear w~en governmental action, taken in conjunction with the
propo~ed bill, could lawfully occur under the second prong92 of the
Dennis test.
The modern doct~i~e, put forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio, concerns
the dangers of political rhetoric and the countervailing First
93
Amendment rights.
In Brandenburg, the Court found that the
g?vernme~t ~ou~~ no~ suppress speech unless the speech in question
~Im~d to mc1te 1mmment lawless action. "94 However, this standard
Is likely inapplic~ble to the ~roposed bill because political speech
would no~ be an issue unless 1t somehow involved activist terrorists
~ollabo.r~tmg to carry out a cyberattack for political causes. Engaging
m pohtic~l . s?eech would not be considered extreme enough to
warran~ lim1tmg access to the Internet under the kill switch bill.
Accordmgly, th~ Schenck and Dennis tests remain the benchmark
~ta1:1~ard .by wh1?h this legislation should be evaluated. Thus, the
J11:diciary Is not likely to declare the bill unconstitutional pursuant to
F_irst ~mendment concerns .. Even if the political action triggered the
kill. switch ~owers, the bill still meets the Constitutional standard
~rticulat~d I~ Brandenburg because the potential calamities would
likely be immment and unlawful.

90.

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).

91.

Id. ("[T]he gravity of the evil[.]").

92.

Id. ("[D]iscounted by its improbability[.]").

93.

Brandenbur~ v. Ohio, ~95

94.

U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (discussing whether an
act can pu~ish advocatmg or teaching violence as opposed to punishin
the actual mtent to cause criminal acts).
g

Id. at 447 C".[T]he constitutio~al guarantees of free speech and free press
do ~ot pen:~it ~ State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
0
or
l~w v~olat~on except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
produci:r:g immment lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.").
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iii.

Censorship

Should a court evaluate the proposed kill switch bill in terms of
censorship under the First Amendment, it would have to assess the
law according to the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v.
United States. 95 In this seminal 1971 case, the Executive Branch
attempted to use its powers to request an injunction against
publication of the Pentagon Papers. 96 In its per curiam decision, the
Court held that the government shoulders a heavy burden of proof
when it seeks to override First Amendment protections. 97
Additionally, Justice Black, in his concurrence, noted that a violation
of free speech was odious to the nation's Founding Fathers. 98
Although the Court did not hold that censorship was per se
unconstitutional, 99 the case did not state precisely when the Executive
may censor speech.
The kill switch bill will have a harder time withstanding
constitutional scrutiny under the New York Times standard than
under other First Amendment jurisprudence analyses. Although the
proposed bill does include what arguably constitutes censorship of the
Internet, would such censorship be lawful considering the inevitable
collateral damage? The level of calamity necessary to trigger the bill
is likely sufficient to protect the rights of free speech under the New
York Times analysis. Yet, while the government does censor the
Internet to some extent, would the breadth of the censorship powers
vested in the Executive under the proposed statute be lawful?
Although our Founding Fathers were wary of censorship and
unchecked powers, they could not have. conceived the possibility of a
An American's Constitutional rights must
massive cyberattack.
protect him or her from this modern, foreseeable danger. The holding
under New York Times affords a strict standard with regard to the
restraints on communications; however, the threat of calamities upon
which the kill switch bill is predicated in order to bar Internet
95.

N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)
(explaining that the government must show justification when it
encroaches upon First Amendment free speech rights).

96.

Id. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring) (describing the government's
attempt to censor newspapers).

97.

Id. at 714 (per curiam) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."').

98.

Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) ("In the First Amendment the
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to
fulfill its essential role in our democracy.").

99.

Id. at 714 (per curiam) (noting that the government must show
justification for placing a restraint on First Amendment free speech).
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dis?ounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as IS necessary to avoid the danger. "90
The kill switch legislation would likely comply with the Schenck
st~ndard and meet the stringency of the conditions necessary to
tngge~ t~e Executive's power under the proposed bill. However, the
analysis is less cl~ar under Dennis. Although attackers may intend to
cause ~~mage serious enough to meet the first prong of the test,91 the
p:obab1lity of the danger coming from its fruition would need to be
high . eno_ugh to merit resorting to the powers granted in the bill.
Consid~rmg the . ea~e with which cyberattacks can occur, the
Executive may conSider multiple attacks "probable." Thus, it is
unclear w~en governmental action, taken in conjunction with the
propo~ed bill, could lawfully occur under the second prong92 of the
Dennis test.
The modern doct~ii:e, put forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio, concerns
the dangers of political rhetoric and the countervailing First
93
Amendment rights.
In Brandenburg, the Court found that the
g?vernmei:t ~ou~~ no~ suppress speech unless the speech in question
~im~d to .mc1te. immment lawless action. "94 However, this standard
18
likely mapplic~ble to the ~roposed bill because political speech
would no~ be an Issue unless it somehow involved activist terrorists
~ollabo.r~tmg to carry out a cyberattack for political causes. Engaging
m politic~l . s?eech would not be considered extreme enough to
warran~ lim1tmg access to the Internet under the kill switch bill.
Accordmgly, th~ Sche.nck and Dennis tests remain the benchmark
~tai:~ard .by wh1:h this legislation should be evaluated. Thus, the
J~diciary is not likely to declare the bill unconstitutional pursuant to
F.Irst ~mendment concerns. . Even if the political action triggered the
kill. switch ~owers, the bill still meets the Constitutional standard
~rticulat~d I~ Brandenburg because the potential calamities would
likely be immment and unlawful.
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94.
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do not per~t ~ State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of l~w v~olat~on except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producu~g munment lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.").

Censorship

Should a court evaluate the proposed kill switch bill in terms of
censorship under the First Amendment, it would have to assess the
law according to the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v.
United States. 95 In this seminal 1971 case, the Executive Branch
attempted to use its powers to request an injunction against
publication of the Pentagon Papers. 96 In its per curiam decision, the
Court held that the government shoulders a heavy burden of proof
when it seeks to override First Amendment protections. 97
Additionally, Justice Black, in his concurrence, noted that a violation
of free speech was odious to the nation's Founding Fathers. 98
Although the Court did not hold that censorship was per se
unconstitutional, 99 the case did not state precisely when the Executive
may censor speech.
The kill switch bill will have a harder time withstanding
constitutional scrutiny under the New York Times standard than
under other First Amendment jurisprudence analyses. Although the
proposed bill does include what arguably constitutes censorship of the
Internet, would such censorship be lawful considering the inevitable
collateral damage? The level of calamity necessary to trigger the bill
is likely sufficient to protect the rights of free speech under the New
York Times analysis. Yet, while the government does censor the
Internet to some extent, would the breadth of the censorship powers
vested in the Executive under the proposed statute be lawful?
Although our Founding Fathers were wary of censorship and
unchecked powers, they could not have conceived the possibility of a
An American's Constitutional rights must
massive cyberattack.
protect him or her from this modern, foreseeable danger. The holding
under New York Times affords a strict standard with regard to the
restraints on communications; however, the threat of calamities upon
which the kill switch bill is predicated in order to bar Internet
95.

90.
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N. Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)

(explaining that the government must show justification when it
encroaches upon First Amendment free speech rights).

96.

Id. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring) (describing the government's
attempt to censor newspapers).

97.

Id. at 714 (per curiam) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity . . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint."').

98.

Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) ("In the First Amendment the
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to
fulfill its essential role in our democracy.").

99.

Id. at 714 (per curiam) (noting that the government must show
justification for placing a restraint on First Amendment free speech).
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connectivity appears likely to withstand scrutiny under the New York
Times legal analysis.
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court considered the issue of
censorship of Internet speech and held that the CDA of 1996 was a
violation of the First Amendment. 100 The Court declared that the
Internet does not 'invade an individual's home" but users do access it
through their own free will. 101 The Court found that the CDA did not
pass strict scrutiny because less restrictive means could not have been
available other than that utilized by the statute. 102 Thus, the Internet
receives stronger First Amendment protection than broadcast
media. 103
The kill switch bill likely would withstand judicial consideration
under Reno. It is possible that the Supreme Court may determine
that the ends of protecting the nation from calamity warranted the
means set forth in the proposed legislation. While the triggering
events are undoubtedly serious, the question becomes whether a more
tailored method of protecting critical infrastructure exists without
granting the Executive additional authority to interfere with Internet
connectivity.
This question warrants serious evaluation.
Nevertheless, it would be expected that the. judiciary would uphold
the bill, given the extenuating and extreme triggering circumstances.
iv. Commercial speech
The proposed kill switch bill may nevertheless violate an
individual's right to engage in commercial speech. In addition to
considering the free speech rights of individuals, the courts also
evaluate an individual's right under this First Amendment rubric.
Companies use the Internet to run their businesses and advertise.
Although advertising is generally protected by the First Amendment,
the Constitution "affords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. "104 To evaluate
commercial speech, courts use the test set forth in Central Hudson

100. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (affording the same
constitutional protections to t~e Internet as are provided to. other types
of speech).
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Gas fj Electric Corp. v. Public Service Communication. 105 In Central
Hudson, the Court held that the government may. regulate
commercial speech if the regulation directly advances an nnportant
interest and is no more restrictive of speech than necessary. 106 The
kill switch bill meets this standard. First, as previously discussed, if
the kill switch bill does not violate the free speech rights of an
individual, it probably would be lawful under the lesser standard used
to protect commercial speech. Second, the bill would likely meet the
Central Hudson test because it would be no more restrictive of speech
than necessary and would advance the interest of national security
protection.
.. .
Moreover, while Central Hudson concerns the specific nght to
advertise, the kill switch bill would not affect the contents of the
advertisements themselves but rather the vehicle through which they
advertise. As such, the bill would not deny advertisers the right to
promote their products but only their ability to market those
products on the Internet. Hence, this analysis is likely not the
appropriate First Amendment test and other legal frameworks should
be applied.
v.

Media

The First Amendment standards regarding free speech in media
do not apply to the kill switch bill. These standards are put forth in
Red Lion v. FCC, in which the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a FCC regulation that mandated broadcasters to
notify individuals they defamed in their program and accord these
individuals an opportunity to respond. 107 The Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the FCC regulation, holding that those who
obtain licenses to broadcast must comply with the applicable
conditions to retain that license. 108 However, broadcast media is
distinguishable from the Internet, as the unique characteristics of the

105. Cent. Hudson Gas f:J Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (describing the four-part analysis that applies to First
Amendment analysis of commercial speech).
106. Id. at 566.

101. Id. at 869 ("[C]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an
individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users
seldom encounter content 'by accident."').
102. Id. at 879 ("We are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if
that requirement has any meaning at all.").
103. See id. at 866 ("Relying on the premise that "of all forms of
communication" broadcasting has received the most limited First
Amendment protection.").
104. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993).
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107. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (holding

that the proposed regulations are constitutional, as they
"enhance rather than abridge the freedoms of speech and press
protected' by the First A mendment ") .
108. Id. at 379 ("The statutory authority of the FCC to promulgate these
regulations derives from the mandate to the 'Commis~ion from. ti~e to
time, as public convenience, interest, or nec.ess1ty reqmr~s . to
promulgate 'such rules and regulations and prescribe such res~r.1ctions
and conditions . . . as may be necessary to carry out the prov1s1ons of
this chapter."').
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Internet include that it is not limited to a finite number of individuals
or organizations who can post, nor are licenses necessary for its use.
The Supreme Court affords more protection under the First
Amendment to the rights of newspapers as opposed to those of
licensed broadcasters. 109 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
the Supreme Court held that a Florida law that required newspapers
to grant equal coverage to political candidates was an unlawful
violation of the freedom of the press.U 0 The Court explained that the
First Amendment applies to newspapers because they are "more than
a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising. "111 The Court clarified its decision by explaining that
"the choice of material to go into a newspaper ... constitute[s] the
exercise of editorial control and judgment," and it "has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time. "112 Although, as envisioned
under the kill switch bill, the regulation of the Internet may impede
the media's ability to disseminate information, Tornillo cannot be
used to analyze the legality of the bill. Tornillo represents the First
Amendment as it applies to print media and grants strong protection
to the content of newspapers.
As was the case with the Red Lion broadcasting example, the kill
switch bill is distinguished from Tornillo. Tornillo concerns the right
of the media to choose its subject matter in accordance with the law,
whereas the bill would affect the general ability to disseminate
information on the Internet. In essence, Tornillo focuses on what
information can be communicated ipso facto while the appropriate
discussion of the bill should focus on the ability to express the
material through the Internet. As such, the analysis of this bill in
conjunction with the freedom of expression enjoyed by the media is
inappropriate.

1934 Communications Act in conjunction with congressional approval
for the bill, this legislation is within the scope of the Executive's
power.
Additionally, the First Amendment's high threshold is
unlikely to trigger action under the bill, which leads to the conclusion
that evaluation under this amendment is unnecessary.
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CONCLUSION

In the modern technological era, cyberattacks continue to be a
real and serious threat. The proposed kill switch bill attempts to bar
Internet connectivity in response to certain anticipated national
security threats. Considering the existing Executive powers under the
109. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(describing the rights afforded to newspapers under the First
Amendment).
110. Id. at 258 (reversing the Supreme Court of Florida, which held that the
regulation was lawful).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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